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Abstract 
Recent papers show that in group decisions individuals have social preferences for efficiency and 
equity. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism 
for public goods, has not been thoroughly examined. This study investigates whether voting 
decisions are affected by the distribution of net benefits associated with a proposed public 
program using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM). Theoretical and econometric 
analysis of experimental results presented in the paper suggest that observed differences from 
selfish voting are caused by a concern for social efficiency, and that voting may be more 
efficient than previously thought. 
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Majority-voting rules are used extensively in modern democracies, by representative 
legislative bodies and in ballot initiatives (referenda), to determine the provision of public goods. 
Such programs and their funding often impose unequal costs and benefits on individuals. If 
voters have social preferences, we should expect their decisions to be influenced by the 
perceived or actual impact of the voting outcome on others. For instance, a strong supporter of a 
school bond may be worried that voting yes on the associated tax may impose costs on the 
elderly that exceed their benefits. The elderly may worry that by voting no they hurt kids even 
though their own children are grown.  
Mounting evidence from the fields of experimental and behavioral economics suggests 
that, indeed, at least a portion of individuals exhibits social preferences in the form of social 
welfare or equity concerns (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000, Charness and Rabin, 2002, Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, and Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt, 
forthcoming). This study seeks to better understand the behavior of individuals in voting 
situations, introduces a new voting mechanism, details its theoretical properties and empirical 
performance, and using it, discerns which theory(ies) of social preferences best explain behavior. 
In the next section, we introduce the issues with a set of experiments that demonstrate that 
individual decisions under a majority-voting rule are inconsistent with the prediction of the 
rational selfish voter model. Two treatments are compared. In the first, groups of three 
participants vote for or against a proposal that has a uniform tax (cost) but provides one of three 
levels of known, different benefits (heterogeneous values) to each participant – high, medium, 
and low. In the second treatment, all participants pay a uniform tax and receive the same benefits 
(homogeneous values) if the program receives a majority vote. This experiment shows that a 
voter facing the prospect of a low benefit and high cost of provision is more likely to vote for the 
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program if others stand to receive benefits that exceed the cost of the good. Similarly, high 
benefit voters are more likely to vote against a proposal that costs less than their value if the 
proposal imposes a cost above value on others. In other words, there appears to be a systematic 
voting anomaly borne from an individual’s assessment of the impact of the program on others. 
One way of exploring the origins of this observed voting behavior would be to collect a 
large number of yes/no (dichotomous) votes for a particular program but at varying 
implementation costs to trace out the demand function and estimate the tax level at which 
various individuals switch their vote. The sample sizes required for this approach are cost-
prohibitive. As an alternative, we propose in Section 3 the Random Price Voting Mechanism 
(RPVM), which is best thought of as a generalization of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) 
mechanism (1964). The RPVM extends the private good BDM mechanism to public goods. A 
proposed public good is implemented whenever a majority of individuals indicate a maximum 
willingness to pay (WTP) greater than or equal to a randomly selected price. In that event, all 
subjects must pay the random price.1  Thus, in contrast to the dichotomous choice format, which 
crudely bounds an individual’s value and only yields a yes or no data point, the RPVM elicits a 
point estimate of the value of the good to subjects. Yet, its coercive tax feature closely parallels 
real ballot initiatives.  Furthermore, the RPVM is less complex than incentive compatible public 
goods funding mechanisms, such as the Smith (1979) Auction and the Groves-Ledyard (1977) 
mechanism. 
In Section 3, we show that the mechanism is incentive compatible in expected utility 
theory for selfish individuals and develop theoretical predictions of behavior for four alternative 
types of social preferences, and for both WTP and WTA with both gains and losses. Voting 
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behavior and the empirical properties of the mechanism itself are explored experimentally with a 
design described in Section 4.   
Experimental results are presented in Section 5. We report four key findings. First, the 
RPVM elicits preferences that are consistent with observed dichotomous (yes/no) votes. Second, 
we show that behavior under the new mechanism is consistent with theory, which predicts 
truthful demand revelation in groups of one or when a program results in equal distribution of 
benefits to all members of a group (regardless of the type of social preferences postulated). 
Third, no evidence of a WTP/WTA discrepancy is found. Finally, an econometric analysis of 
voting patterns leads us to conclude that voters in our experiments were motivated by the appeal 
of their own potential gains as well as by a concern for the overall efficiency of proposed 
programs (consistent with altruism as defined by Bergstrom, 2006). These findings suggest that 
voting may be more efficient than previously thought.  
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. It demonstrates experimentally the 
presence of behavioral anomalies in dichotomous voting. It introduces a new public goods 
mechanism and analyzes its theoretical properties. The application of the mechanism 
demonstrates its demand revealing properties under all four Hicksian measures of welfare change 
and makes it possible to identify econometrically which type of social preferences most 
powerfully explain observed voting behavior.  
The results and their implications for public policy, future research, and the overall 
efficiency of voting are further discussed in conclusion. 
I. Evidence of Distributional Effects on Voting Decisions  
A thin empirical literature on the determinants of voting patterns in real ballots suggests 
the presence of non-selfish considerations in the voter’s decision-making process (Mueller, 1989; 
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Deacon and Shapiro, 1975).  In this section, we use simple dichotomous (yes/no) voting 
laboratory experiments to show that voting anomalies exist. These experiments, as well as the 
RPVM experiments discussed later, were conducted at the Cornell University’s Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics & Decision Research using students drawn from undergraduate 
business and economics classes. 
The first experiment employed 174 subjects to explore the effects of heterogeneous 
versus homogeneous values on voting (see Appendix A for experiment instructions). All subjects 
were placed in groups of three voters and given an initial endowment of $10. In each decision 
task, the subject was assigned one of three possible induced values: $2, $5, or $8, which was the 
amount that the individual would receive if the majority of group members vote in favor. Each 
participant made six voting decisions where her own value, the value of other group members, 
and the implementation cost varied across decisions. Exactly one participant received each of the 
$2, $5, and $8 values in heterogeneous value decisions. To minimize learning effects, only one 
voting outcome was binding and this was randomly determined after all decisions were made.  
In one set of sessions participants faced heterogeneous distributions of values (Table A1 
in Appendix A). In the second set of sessions participants faced homogeneous and heterogeneous 
distributions of values (Table A2 in Appendix A). The order of decisions was reversed in 
individual sessions within each set (see Appendix A for details). Variations in the level of the 
uniform tax were set to favor detection of non-selfish behavior. A $7.50 tax was used to examine 
the behavior of voters with an induced value of $8, taxes of $4.50 and $5.50 were imposed on 
participants with a $5 induced value, while a $2.50 tax was utilized to examine responses from 
those with a $2 induced value. 
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Figure 1 provides a comparison of voting in homogenous and heterogeneous conditions 
by subjects with a $2 induced value facing a $2.50 tax and those with an $8 induced value facing 
a tax of $7.50. When $2 subjects were in homogenous value groups ($2,$2,$2), 5.7% of subjects 
voted in favor of the program compared to 18.6% in the heterogeneous value case ($2,$5,$8). 
Using a t-test, this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. For $8 value subjects 
facing a uniform tax of $7.50, 86.4% vote in favor of the program when everyone stands to gain 
$8 while only 73.3% vote yes when the distribution of benefits is ($2,$5,$8). This difference is 
significant at the 3% level. 
In contrast, the behavior of the $5 value individuals is quite similar across homogeneous 
and heterogeneous settings, yielding no statistical differences at tax rates of either $4.50 or 
$5.50. In particular, for the higher cost of $5.50, 8.2% of subjects voted yes in the homogeneous 
treatment, while 12.2% votes yes in the heterogeneous treatment (p=0.505).  For the lower cost 
of $4.50, 92.3% votes yes in the homogeneous treatment, while 84.6% votes yes in the 
heterogeneous treatment (p=0.288).  
The detection of statistical differences in the behavior of the $2 and $8 subjects across 
value settings suggests that distributional considerations impact the utility of voters and their 
choices. In the heterogeneous value case, a tax of $7.50 would impose a loss of $2.50 on subjects 
with a $5 value and a loss of $5.50 on subjects with a $2 value. The results suggest that subjects 
are concerned that they may impose losses on others (either all others, the “average” other 
subject or the worst of them). Such a voting pattern is consistent with the conjecture made by 
Johannesson et al (1996) in a study on the value of statistical life employing votes for 
hypothetical safety programs. They argued that pure altruism (consistent with efficiency in most 
studies) implies that high value voters will alter their votes in consideration of other voters who 
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stand to gain less (or even lose). Similarly, the results for the $2 subjects would be consistent 
with those voters getting positive utility from the gains of others. As Bergstrom (2006) reminds 
us “If we are to count the sympathetic gains each obtains from the other’s enjoyment of the 
shared public good, then we should not forget also to count the sympathetic losses each bears 
from the share of its costs paid by the others” (p. 399). 
II. The Random Price Voting Mechanism and Behavioral Predictions 
In this section, we formally introduce the Random Price Voting Mechanism and develop 
theoretical predictions of bidding behavior for it. For ease of exposition, we focus the 
presentation on the case where the game is played in the WTP for gains domain, and for the case 
where individuals have “social welfare” motives (Charness and Rabin, 2002). These results are 
readily extended to the other three Hicksian measures (WTP to avoid a loss and WTA a loss or 
forego a gain) and for three other forms of preferences considered in this paper. Once the results 
for the social welfare function have been established, we briefly discuss these extensions. 
Behavioral predictions for all permutations are summarized in Table 1.  
The mechanism proposed here combines the incentive compatible properties (under 
expected utility maximization) of the private goods BDM with a majority voting rule. In the 
BDM, a person is asked to provide a signal of their WTP for an object. If a randomly drawn 
price is no greater than the individual’s signal, the individual buys the good at the random price. 
If the price is higher, no transaction takes place. 
For expected utility maximizers, the “second price” property of the BDM mechanism 
eliminates the incentives for strategic bidding, making truthful revelation of one’s value for the 
object a dominant strategy. This is confirmed by experimental tests (Irwin et al. 1998). The 
traditional BDM mechanism, however, cannot readily be used to elicit the value of a public 
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good. Anyone in a group of players might alter his signal (free-ride) if the object was a non-
excludable good and only one buyer is required for all to enjoy full benefits. While the RVPM 
maintains the second price property, it is necessary to add an allocation rule that prevents 
strategic behavior. We do this with a majority rule. In addition to being a simple and familiar 
approach to collective decision-making, laboratory experiments have shown that majority voting 
can be incentive compatible (Plott and Levine, 1978) like more general binary choice approaches 
(Farquharson, 1969).  
A. The RPVM 
The RVPM works as follows: N individuals are asked to signal the maximum amount of 
money they would be prepared to pay for a program defined by a known vector 
( )1 2, ,..., Nπ π π∏ = . In the WTP for gains domain, jπ represents the individual benefits to be 
received by individual j if the program is implemented.  
The public program that is submitted to a “vote” has two components: 1) the induced 
values ∏  and 2) a transfer payment (C) from individuals to the implementing authority. This 
cost (uniform tax) is randomly drawn from a distribution with probability density p(C) over the 
interval  [0,Cmax ] , after individuals have signaled their WTP. In what follows, we refer to 
individual i’s signal as his “bid” and denote it by Bi . 
 For implementation of the program, a majority of individuals (>50%) must have 
expressed a WTP that exceeds a per-person cost C. If a majority of bids are greater than or equal 
to C, individual i receives a monetary payoff i Cπ −  (the sum of which could be negative) to be 
added to an initial endowment Y for a utility level ( )i i iU u Y Cπ= + − . If the majority of bids are 
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below C, the program is not implemented and subjects retain their initial endowment for 
utility ( )i iU u Y= . We assume that U is increasing.  
B. Value Revelation as a Dominant Strategy of Selfish Players 
It can readily be argued that a self-interested individual has a weakly dominant strategy to 
choose the truthful signal *i iB π= . The demonstration proceeds from a standard second price 
argument. As Karni and Safra (1987) and Horowitz (Forthcoming) demonstrate, the simpler 
BDM is not always incentive compatible outside of the expected utility framework. For this 
reason, we limit our analysis to expected utility.  
We denote a vector of strategies chosen by the N-1 other players by iB− .
2  For our 
purposes, however, it will be sufficient to characterize an admissible strategy profile simply by 
the pair of numbers ( mB , kB ). mB is defined as the ( 1) / 2N + th largest bid in the vector.  In other 
words, the interval [Bm , Bk ] defines the range over which the bid of voter i makes this individual 
the median voter. For N=3, this is the smallest of the two bids in iB− ; for N=5, it is the third 
largest of four, and so forth. kB is defined as the ( 1) / 2N − th largest bid in iB− (for N=3, Bk is the 
largest of the other two bids, for N=5 it is the second largest, and so forth.). Note that for odd N, 
mB < kB . 
To establish that *i iB π=  is a weakly dominant strategy we must establish that 
( , ) ( , )i i i i i i i i iEU B B EU B B Bπ π− − −= ≥ ≠ ∀ in the ( 1)*( 1)N N− − strategy space of the other 
players. We proceed by considering different subsets of this space, and for each, demonstrating 
that no strategy exists for player i that provides greater utility than i iB π= ( iπ is fixed 
throughout). 
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Case 1: i mBπ ≤ (< kB ), Decreasing iB    
In the first subset of iB−  strategy profiles, we group all profiles for which i mBπ ≤ (< kB ). First, 
we consider the possibility of decreasing a bid from i iB π=  to a smaller amount. Since i mBπ ≤ , 
a majority of players can be found among the other players to fund any project with a random 
cost mC B≤ . Therefore, a reduction in iB  leaves the probability that the program will be 
implemented unchanged at 
0
( )
mB
p C dc∫ . Furthermore, for any i iB π≤ , conditional utility levels 
are ( )i iu Y Cπ+ −  if mC B≤  and ( )iu Y otherwise. Thus, utility levels are also unchanged by 
lowering iB .  The conclusion is that for all iB−  such that m iB π≥ , there are no gains (nor any 
losses) to be realized by reducing one’s bid below iπ .  
Case 2 i mBπ ≤ (< kB ), Increasing iB  
Continuing with the same subset of others’ strategy profiles, we now analyze the desirability of 
increasing iB  beyond iπ . First, we note that since i mBπ ≤ , increasing the bid beyond iπ  has no 
consequences on i’s expected utility if the new bid i mB B≤% . This mimics the argument 
developed in Case 1. A signal i mB B≤ does not affect the probability of funding and does not 
modify the conditional utility levels. Neither gains nor losses are therefore realized by increasing 
iB  up to and including mB .  
 An increase beyond mB will, however, decrease expected utility.  For m i kB B B< ≤% , iB  
becomes the threshold bid in the sense that it defines the largest realization of C that leads to the 
implementation of the program. Pushing iB%  into this range increases the probability that the 
program will be implemented. However, any time a program is implemented where mC B> , we 
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know by the defining conditions of Case 2 that 0i Cπ − < . Hence, ( ) ( )i i iu Y C u Yπ+ − < . These 
are programs that reduce player i’s utility. It follows that choosing m i kB B B< ≤%  produces lower 
expected utility than the strategy i mB B=  which, we have already established, yields the same 
expected utility as the strategy i iB π= . This establishes that i iB π=  is strictly superior to 
m i kB B B< ≤% against profiles characterized by i mBπ ≤ .  
 Finally, consider i kB B>% . For all such strategies, kB  is the threshold value of C leading 
to implementation of the program. Increases of iB  beyond kB  leave the probability of 
implementation unchanged at 
0
( )
kB
p C dc∫ . It follows that any strategy i kB B>%  leads to the same 
expected utility as the strategy i kB B= , which we just established as being inferior to i iB π= .    
 By virtue of Cases 1 and 2, we have established that for any strategy profile iB−  such that 
i mBπ ≤ , ( , ) ( , )i i i i i i i iEU B B EU B Bπ π− −= ≥ ≠ . 
Case 3: ( )m k iB B π< < , Increasing iB  
We now turn to the subset of iB−  strategy profiles for which ( )m k iB B π< < . We first tackle the 
possibility of player i bidding i iB π≥% . Since k iB π< , it follows immediately, as above, that the 
probability that the program will be implemented remains unchanged for all i kBB > . Once 
again, since the conditional payoffs are also unaffected by increases in iB , it follows that for the 
category of strategy profiles considered here, ( , ) ( , )i i i i i i iEU B B EU Bπ π− −> = .     
Case 4: ( )m k iB B π< < , Decreasing iB  
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As Case 4, we consider the possibility of reducing i’s bid from i i kB Bπ= > . Such a move has 
either no effect on i’s utility (if i kB B≥% ) or strictly reduces it (if i kB B<% ).  
 By the same logic presented in Case 3, choosing k i iB B π≤ <%  has no impact on the 
expected utility of player i.  
 This is not the case if the bid is further reduced to m i kB B B≤ <% . Now, iB%  becomes the 
threshold that defines the lowest level of C leading to implementation of the program. As the bid 
decreases below kB , it lowers the probability that the program will be funded. This decrease in 
probability is entirely associated with realizations of C in the interval ( , )i kB B% . Since k iB π< , 
implementation of those programs would have benefited player i. It follows that bidding 
i kB B≥% (and getting the same expected utility as with i iB π= ) dominates m i kB B B≤ <% for all 
strategy profile characterized by ( )m k iB B π< < . 
 Further reductions of the signal below mB  do not reduce the probability of funding any 
further, nor does it change the conditional utility in the two states of the world. Thus the 
expected utility for i mB B<% is the same as that for m i kB B B≤ <% which is in turn lower than the 
utility for i iB π= . 
Collecting the results from Cases 3 and 4 establishes that 
( , ) ( , )i i i i i i iEU B B EU Bπ π− −= ≥ for all iB− such that ( )m k iB B π< < . 
Case 5: m i kB Bπ≤ ≤ : Increasing or Decreasing iB   
This last case includes all remaining strategy profiles iB− not yet considered. As we can 
infer from the analysis of previous cases, these strategy profiles put player i’s strategy i iB π=  in 
the critical zone where it is the determinant of the probability that the program will be 
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implemented. Increasing or decreasing iB  leads to a change in the probability of funding the 
public program. As iB  increases up to kB , the increased probability of funding is associated with 
cases where iC π> , necessarily lowering expected utility. As before, further increases of iB%  
beyond kB do not result in further decreases in expected utility, but do not offer any increase 
either. It follows that the strategy i iB π=  strictly dominates i iB π>%  when iB−  is such 
that m i kB Bπ≤ ≤ .  
By similar reasoning, i iB π=  also strictly dominates i iB π<% . The reduction in bid into 
the region i mB B≤% decreases the probability that beneficial programs (with iC π< ) will be 
implemented but offers no offsetting gain. Further decreases in iB%  have no additional effect on 
expected utility. For Case 5, m i kB Bπ≤ ≤ ,we conclude that ( , ) ( , )i i i i i i i iEU B B EU B Bπ π− −= > ≠  
for all iB−  such that m i kB Bπ≤ ≤ . 
With cases 1 to 5, we have explored the entire strategy space of the N-1 other players, 
and considered all possible deviations from the strategy i iB π= . Yet, under no circumstances 
can departing from the strategy i iB π=  yield an increase in player i‘s expected utility. i iB π=  is 
therefore a weakly dominant strategy for Player i.  With all players postulated to be selfish and 
with an increasing utility function, all other players also have a dominant strategy to 
play j jB π= . This establishes that truthful revelation by all players is a Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium of the RPVM game. While deviating from i iB π= will, on occasion, not change the 
expected utility of player i, this is only true when iB− is known and given. With any uncertainty 
surrounding the other player’s choice of strategy, all strategies i iB π≠  will necessarily have a 
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lower level of expected utility since they will be played with some probability against a iB− for 
which i iB π= dominates. In this context, i iB π= is a weakly dominant strategy of the RPVM. 
C. Behavioral Predictions for Players with Social Preferences  
In this section, we look more closely at the theoretical predictions emanating from more 
explicit models of individuals with social preferences. The corresponding utility functions will 
contain new arguments (the potential payoffs to others) and exhibit particulars that require a less 
general solution concept than shown in the previous section. We present with some detail the 
solution for individuals with social efficiency preferences expressing their WTP for a program 
conferring gains. We then summarize the predictions for four alternative models and for the 
remaining three welfare settings.  
An individual i with social efficiency preferences is postulated to have utility that is 
increasing (decreasing) in the gains (losses) of others and of the form 
 
Ui = u Y + π i − C + α i ⋅ (π j − C)( )
j≠ i
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ , where α i ≥ 0  parameterizes the intensity of individual i 
altruism (for pure selfishness, 0iα = ). This is a purely altruistic individual who weights equally 
the gains and losses to others. It can be considered a special case of Charness and Rabin’s (2002) 
social welfare function.  
To compute the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium we once again rely on the critical values Bm 
and Bk, the interval defining the range over which the bid of voter i makes this individual the 
median voter. Thus, i’s expected utility can be expressed as 
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(1)  
( )
( ) ( )max
0
, ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
m
i
m
k
i k
B
i i i i i j
j i
B
i i j
j iB
B C
B B
EU B B p C U Y C C dC
p C U Y C C dC
p C U Y dC p C U Y dC
π α π
π α π
−
≠
≠
⎛ ⎞= + − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ + − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ +
∑∫
∑∫
∫ ∫
 .   
The first term is the expected utility conditional on the randomly drawn cost being below Bm. 
Here, i’s bid is irrelevant since there is already a majority of voters willing to pay more than the 
cost of implementing the program. The second and third terms cover the interval over which the 
bid of individual i will have a marginal effect on the probability that the program is 
implemented. Conditional on C falling in that range, Bi is effectively the median bid. The last 
term is the interval over which i has no effect on the outcome since no matter how large Bi is, too 
few individuals have bid high enough to implement the program.  
In searching for an equilibrium, we focus on affine bidding strategies. Let individual i 
conjecture that individuals m and k choose bids of the form 
(2)          m m m m j
j m
B γ π α π
≠
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑       
and 
(3)    k k k k j
j k
B γ π α π
≠
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ .     
where kγ and mγ  are positive (still unknown) constants. Substituting these expressions in 
Equation 1 and maximizing with respect to Bi yields the first order condition: 
(4)   ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i j i i
j i
p B U Y B B p B U Yπ α π
≠
⎛ ⎞+ − + ⋅ − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ .  
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This equation has a degenerate solution at ( ) 0ip B = that can safely be ignored. The 
interior solution equates expected utility under the two states of the world (the program is funded 
or not). Solving for iB , the optimal bid is given by:  
(5)     *
1 ( 1)
i i j
j i
i
i
B
N
π α π
α
≠
+
= + −
∑
.     
The optimal strategy has a form that matches the priors of individual i regarding the bidding 
strategies of m (Equation 2) and k (Equation 3) for ( )1 1 ( 1)i iNγ α= + − . Thus, if all N players 
adopt the linear conjecture and bid their optimum, all conjectures are simultaneously proven 
correct. No one has any incentive to deviate, establishing that (Equation 5) is a Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium.3 It is useful to note that the private BDM is nestled in the RPVM. Setting N=1 
yields the familiar BDM result:  Bi
* = π i .  
A number of testable behavioral predictions emerge from this solution.  
1) If j i jπ π= ∀ , *i iB π= . Truthful revelation is optimal with equal payoffs because bidding 
above induced value increases the probability that the program will be funded in the range where 
costs exceed everyone’s benefits. Bidding below value is also sub-optimal since it reduces the 
probability that the program will be implemented, in the range where everyone could benefit. 
2) The optimal bid is increasing in one’s induced value since  
(6)    
* 1 0
1 ( 1)
i
i i
B
Nπ α
∂ = >∂ + − .      
3) For social welfare preferences, an increase (decrease) in the sum of gains of others increases 
(decreases) i’s optimal bid: 
(7)    
*
0
1 ( 1)
i i
j i
B
N
α
π α
∂ = >∂ + − .       
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4) By direct extension of Equation 7, individual i will increase (decrease) his bid when moving 
from a homogenous distribution where i j jπ π π= = ∀ , to a heterogeneous distribution where all 
payoffs other than his own are increased (decreased). For example, while everyone in a 
($2,$2,$2) distribution is predicted to bid $2, the $2 individual in a ($2,$5,$8) distribution would 
set * $2iB > . The individual values the higher benefits to others and is thus prepared to incur (in 
expectation) a personal cost to increase the probability that the program will be implemented. On 
the other hand, an $8 type would bid less in the ($2,$5,$8) distribution than for a ($8,$8,$8) 
program regardless of the scenario presented. These results are summarized in the first row of 
Table 1. 
WTA and Losses for A 
The theory can be reinterpreted to describe the optimal bidding strategy for an individual 
expressing his minimum WTA compensation to forego gains. In this case, C represents the 
randomly determined compensation to be paid in exchange for not receiving a payoff defined by 
∏ . Bi then denotes the smallest amount that individual i would accept. If a majority of bids are 
less than or equal to C, compensation C is paid but the gains ∏  are not, for a utility level 
i
j i
U Y C Cα
≠
⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . Otherwise, ∏ is paid and utility is i i jj iU Y π α π≠
⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ .  
Re-deriving the optimal bidding strategy yields exactly Equation 5 and the same 
theoretical predictions, although the vector ∏ now represents individual opportunity costs of 
implementing the compensation program. An increase in the opportunity cost of any player 
implies a decrease in the social value of the compensation offer, and therefore increases the 
minimum acceptable level of compensation required by voters. In Table 1, the “smallest π ” is 
therefore the smallest absolute induced value, be it a gain or a loss.4   
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The optimal strategies for the WTA compensation for a program that imposes a loss and 
for the WTP for a program that eliminates a loss also replicate Equation 5.  
Alternative Forms of Other-Regarding Preferences for B 
Similar approaches can be followed to analyze the optimal bidding strategy of voters who 
have different forms of social preferences. Of interest are three other utility specifications that 
can be identified by the experimental data we collected. They are the Maximin utility (Charness 
and Rabin, 2002) (MM), a version of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) (ERC) theory of equity, and 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (FS) inequity aversion preferences. For empirical reasons discussed 
later, we also produce behavioral predictions for a model where players care simultaneously 
about social efficiency of the program and the welfare of the poorest player (i.e. Maximin 
preferences).  
Perhaps the most intuitive approach to understanding the results of Table 1 is to focus 
immediately on the predictions in the last column of Column 4. First, no matter what type of 
preferences, gains or losses, WTA or WTP, the predicted bid when all payoffs are equal 
(homogenous distribution) is *i iB π= for all players. In contrast, heterogeneous distributions will 
have varied effects under alternative preferences.  To review these effects, consider the vector 
=(2, 5, 8)Π  as an example.  
B.1 Maximin 
With Maximin preferences, utility depends on one’s own payoff as well as on the 
potential gains (losses) of the individual who stands to gain the least (lose the most) from 
implementing the program. Denoting the payoff for this “worst off” player by wπ ,we write this 
social component into the utility function by adding the term ( )i w Cα π+ −  to player i’s own 
earnings. However, it is now necessary to identify the worst off player. In WTP cases, the person 
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who potentially gains the least (loses the most), is the one with the smallest induced value 
( $2wπ =  in our example). This is true regardless of whether the WTP is for a gain or to avoid a 
loss. The prediction is that this person will bid exactly $2, while others will bid less than induced 
value in order to reduce the probability that a net loss will be imposed on the $2 individual.  
In WTA scenarios, the individual with a high absolute induced value is the worst off and 
the prediction is that those with lower absolute induced values will set *i iB π>  to reduce the 
probability of imposing costs on the $8 individual. 
B.2 ERC Preferences 
With ERC preferences, individual inequity aversion manifests itself as disutility when the 
individual’s payoff differs from the mean group payoff. The social component of utility assumed 
here is ( ) ( )
1
1 N
i i j
j
C C
N
α π π
=
− − − −∑ (written for a WTP gains context). Those with a payoff 
exactly equal to the mean will continue to optimally bid *i iB π= . However, others will behave 
differently. In the gains domain, individuals will be willing to pay less than their private value 
for a program that provides additional income, and will require a smaller amount of 
compensation to forego such gains. This happens because the program creates inequities that 
offset part of the individual’s own payoff. The opposite behavior should be observed in the 
losses domain. Individuals will require more than their private value in compensation to accept a 
loss and be willing to pay more to avoid a loss.  
B.3 FS Preferences 
FS preferences differ from ERC preferences in two aspects. First, the aversion to inequity 
comes from a direct comparison of one’s payoff with that of other individuals (rather than with 
the mean). Second, FS preferences allow for different valuations of positive and negative 
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differences between individual payoffs. The function we employ is 
( ) ( ),0 ( ) ( ),0
1 1
i i
j i i j
j i j i
Max C C Max C C
N N
α βπ π π π
≠ ≠
− − − − − − − −− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ . Fehr and Schmidt postulate 
that individuals are less affected by differences in their favor than by situations where they are 
the poor party in the comparison (a situation that would be characterized by i iα β≥ ).  
Practically, this implies that all individuals (even one with a payoff equal to the mean) get 
disutility from a heterogeneous distribution. It follows that all individuals in any game with 
heterogeneous distributions will be willing to pay less than their induced value for gains and 
willing to accept less than induced value to forego a gain. By the same logic, all individuals will 
be willing to pay more than induced value to avoid unequal group losses and require greater 
compensation to accept them. 
B.4 Combining Social Efficiency (Pure Altruism) and Maximin Preferences 
As Charness and Rabin (2002) postulated in their work, it is actually possible that 
individuals may have preferences that simultaneously reflect a concern for both social efficiency 
and care for those who stand to gain least or lose most from the implementation of a program. 
Because we will be estimating this model in the empirical section of the paper, we introduce it 
here and in Table 1. The combined components of social concerns are given by 
( )( )i j i w
j i
C Cα π β π
≠
+ − + −∑ . While we still obtain that individuals in groups of one or facing 
homogeneous distributions optimally bid their induced values, combining these two types of 
preferences modifies the behavioral predictions in interesting ways.  
 The worst off player in heterogeneous distributions (the lowest absolute induced value in 
WTP and largest in WTA) (qualitatively) abandon their Maximin because they now care about 
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the fate of others whose welfare could be improved (more) by the program. Thus, the worst off 
player in WTP games increase their bid above wπ while those in WTA games decrease their bid.  
 A player with a payoff equal to the mean of the distribution on the other hand, would now 
definitely behave like a Maximin. The pure altruism model left this player ambivalent between 
favoring the best off or worst off individuals in under the social welfare function assumption. 
This ambivalence is shattered in favor of the worst off individual who now has greater weight on 
the average player’s utility. For individuals at or above average payoff, the concerns for 
efficiency and the worst off individual both push the bid in the direction of wπ . However, for 
individuals with induced values between wπ and the average payoff of the distribution, the two 
sources of utility are actually in conflict and weight in opposite direction. On the one hand, 
concern for the worst off pulls the optimal bid toward wπ  to minimize potential losses for that 
player. Efficiency, on the other hand, calls for moving one’s bid away from own payoff and in 
the direction of the average payoff. This implies a fixed point between wπ  and the average 
payoff defining a value where bid is equal to induced value.      
III. Experimental Design 
To test the theories outlined above, an additional 276 participants were recruited from a 
variety of undergraduate business and economics courses. Each session consisted of either two 
WTP experiments: WTP-Gains and WTP-Losses (n=138) or two WTA experiments: WTA-
Gains and WTP-Losses (n=138), representing all four welfare settings. All sessions consisted of 
four parts; an example session is as follows: 
Part A: WTP-Losses, low-incentive practice rounds using the RPVM in a private 
setting where the cost and payoffs were determined for each round. 
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Part B: WTP-Losses, high-incentive private and public RPVM treatments where 
the treatment and cost which resulted in earnings were determined for one 
randomly selected treatment at the end of the experiment. 
Part C: WTP-Gains, low-incentive practice rounds using the RPVM in a private 
setting where the cost and payoffs were determined for each round. 
Part D: WTP-Gains, high-incentive private and public RPVM treatments where 
the treatment and cost which resulted in earnings were determined for one 
randomly selected treatment at the end of the experiment. 
To control for potential order effects, the order of parts was varied across sessions 
switching between ABCD and CDAB as described above. Further, Part B and Part D varied the 
order of the treatments with respect to the amount of the induced values, voting group size, and 
the distribution of values among group members. In public RPVM treatments, subjects were 
provided complete information about the payoff amounts of the other subjects. To prevent order 
effects from potentially deteriorating social preference behavior as is common in repeated 
voluntary contribution games (Davis and Holt, 1993), subjects submitted bids for the treatments 
in Part B and Part D without feedback. At the end of the experiment one of the nine RPVM 
programs was implemented from both Part B and Part D by having the subjects draw from a bag 
of marked poker chips. The exchange rate for Part A and Part C was fifteen experimental dollars 
for one US dollar, while the exchange rate for Part B and Part D was one experimental dollar for 
one US dollar. The experiment lasted approximately one and one-half hours and the average 
payoff was $35.  
Subjects received written instructions (see the example for WTP-Gains in Appendix B) 
and were permitted to ask questions at the beginning of each part of the experiment. The 
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instructions used language parallel to that found in public referenda. The WTP instructions 
directed each subject to vote whether to fund a program by submitting a bid that represented the 
“highest amount that you would pay and still vote for the program.” The WTA instructions 
directed each subject to vote whether to implement a program by submitting an offer that 
represents the “lowest amount of compensation that you would accept and still vote against the 
program.” Each subject was seated at an individual computer equipped with a privacy shield. 
Subjects were assigned into voting groups of varying size of either one or three. For the groups 
of three, the administrators announced the groups and asked each group member to raise their 
hand so that they could be identified by other members of their group. This ensured that subjects 
were aware of who was in their voting group for all treatments. No communication was allowed. 
For simplicity, consider the WTP-Gains experiment. In each treatment, subjects started 
with an initial balance of $10 and were assigned an induced value ($1, $2, $4, $5, $6, $8 or $9). 
Subjects then decided how much to bid ranging from zero to the entire initial balance. After the 
subjects submitted their bids, the cost for the program was determined by using a random 
numbers table with values from zero to nine. The first random number from the table represented 
the dollars amount, the second number the dimes amount, and the third number the pennies 
amount. For example, if the first random number was a four, the second was a nine, and the third 
was a four, the determined cost would have been $4.94. Consequently, the cost was uniformly 
distributed between $0.00 and $9.99 with discrete intervals of $0.01. 
Treatments consisted of groups of three or one participant where treatments with group 
size of one were identical to the private good BDM as each subject’s bid constitutes a majority. 
In WTP-Gain treatments, if the majority of the bids were greater than or equal to the randomly 
determined cost, then the program was funded. In this case, all of the subjects in the voting group 
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received their personal payoff amount in addition to the initial balance, but also had to pay the 
determined cost. If the majority of bids were less than the randomly determined cost, then the 
program was not funded. In this case, all of the subjects in the voting group neither received their 
personal payoff amount nor paid the cost, and thus, the subjects received only their initial 
balance. 
 For all welfare settings, the majority of the public good treatments with heterogeneous 
values were conducted with a symmetric distribution, i.e. ($2,$5,$8) (93 subjects for WTP; 93 
for WTA). In addition, to help identify the parameters of the alternative social welfare bid 
functions, sessions were conducted that had heterogeneous values with asymmetric distributions, 
i.e. ($4,$5,$9) and ($1,$5,$6) (45 subjects for WTP; 45 subjects for WTA).5 For the WTP 
experiments, in the private good treatments, a subject’s optimal strategy was to either submit a 
bid equal to her induced value or one penny less, due to discrete costs. For the voting groups of 
three, the majority rule introduced a coercive tax element, because if a majority of the group 
submitted bids greater than or equal to the randomly determined price, then everyone had to pay 
the price regardless of their individual bids.  
For the WTP-Losses experiments if a majority of the bids was less than the random cost, 
the program was not funded. Consequently, all group members have their personal loss amount 
deducted from their initial balance of $10. If the majority of bids were greater than or equal to 
the determined cost, the program was funded and all voting group members had to pay the 
determined cost from their initial balance of $10 but did not have the personal loss amount 
deduced. For WTP-Losses, the same logic holds as the majority rule could force a low value 
subject to pay a higher cost then their induced value and the high value subject may be denied 
the opportunity of paying a cost lower than their induced value. The logic of how the vote creates 
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a coercive tax element for both the induced gains and induced losses treatments is identical in the 
WTA-Gains and WTA-Losses experiments. 
 For the WTA experiments, subjects submitted offers that represented the lowest amount 
of compensation they would accept where the optimal offers were either the induced value or 
one penny above it. The induced gains and losses were the same as the WTP setting and the 
possible compensation again ranged from $0.00 to $9.99. To avoid income effects, the initial 
balance was $5 which made the expected earnings in the WTA setting equivalent to the WTP 
setting. In WTA-Gains, an offer was the lowest amount a subject would accept to vote against 
the program which otherwise would provided the subject a gain. If the majority of the offers 
were less than or equal to the random compensation, then the program was not implemented and 
all voting group members received the compensation in addition to their initial balance. If the 
majority of the offers were greater than the random compensation, the program was 
implemented and the group members received their personal payoff amount in addition to their 
initial balance.  
 In contrast, in WTA-Losses, an offer represented the lowest amount a subject would 
accept to vote in favor of the program, which forced the subject to pay the induced loss if funded. 
Therefore, if the majority of offers were less than or equal to the random compensation, the 
program was implemented and all group members received the compensation and the initial 
balance but had to pay their induced losses. If the majority of the offers were greater than the 
random compensation, the program was not implemented and all group members kept their 
initial balance. 
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IV. Results 
Similar to other studies using the BDM mechanism (Boyce et al. 1992; Irwin et al. 1998), 
the goal of the initial low-incentive practice rounds was to give subjects an opportunity to gain 
experience with the mechanism before introducing additional complexities to the decision 
environment. Repeated low incentive private rounds provided subjects an opportunity to receive 
feedback on how their bids and offers affected their payoff. Over ten practice rounds, subjects’ 
bids/offers converged towards induced value, starting at $0.69 above induced value in the first 
round and declining by 70% to only $0.21 above induced value in the tenth round. By the last 
practice round subjects’ offers/bids were statistically indistinguishable from their induced values 
in all four welfare settings (One Sample T-test). 
A. Comparing RPVM with Dichotomous Choice Voting 
 Direct comparisons can be made between the dichotomous choice data presented earlier 
in Section 2 and selected treatments from the RPVM experiment, in particular, the ($2,$2,$2), 
($5,$5,$5), ($8,$8,$8) and ($2,$5,$8) value distributions for the WTP-Gains setting. First, we 
find a close correspondence between dichotomous choice voting at a particular cost and the 
number of RPVM subjects who bid at or above that same cost (and are thus indicating they 
would vote “yes” at this cost). For example, 23.7% of RPVM subjects with a $2 value indicated 
that they would pay at least $2.50 for a program that had benefits that were distributed 
heterogeneously ($2,$5,$8). This percentage is statistically indistinguishable from the 18.6% of 
subjects who voted yes in the similar dichotomous choice voting setting (p = 0.410).  As shown 
in Table 2, in fact, none of the dichotomous choice voting treatments yielded results that were 
statistically different than the results of the RPVM.  
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Second, the differences between RPVM homogeneous and heterogeneous treatments 
mirror that found for dichotomous choice voting. For $2 value subjects, a statistically different 
and higher percentage of subjects in heterogeneous value treatments bid at or above $2.50 (p = 
0.004). This difference across treatments, -11.9%, is quite similar to the -12.9% difference in the 
dichotomous choice experiment. For $8 value subjects, a statistically different and lower 
percentage of subjects in heterogeneous value treatments bid at or above $7.50 (p = 0.003). This 
difference across RPVM treatments, 10.8%, is quite similar to 13.1% difference in the 
dichotomous choice experiment. Similar to dichotomous choice, no difference across RPVM 
treatments is found for $5 subjects at costs of $4.50 (3.2% difference, similar to 4.0% in 
dichotomous choice) (p = 0.320) or $5.50 (-4.3% difference, similar to -7.7% in dichotomous 
choice) (p = 0.320). Overall, there is a very close correspondence between dichotomous choice 
voting and RPVM bidding both in levels and in terms of homogeneous versus heterogeneous 
treatment differences. 
B. RPVM Bidding Behavior and the Nature of Social Preferences  
The RPVM experiments yield 76 unique (high incentive) treatments, where a treatment is 
defined by a specific welfare setting (e.g. WTP-gains), the subject’s induced value, and the 
distribution of other players’ values (if any). To facilitate comparisons between bidding behavior 
and induced values, we pool the data from all treatments and regress individual bids on 76 
indicator variables to produce estimates of the average bid in each treatment. As each individual 
produces multiple observations, we estimate robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
individual level. Given all decisions from the individual are made without feedback, there are no 
controls for learning behavior. Tables 3 and 4 present the treatment-specific mean bids for the 
gains and loss settings, respectively, for both WTP and WTA. Estimates that are statistically 
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different than induced value at the 5% level are italicized. Inspection of these results suggests 
that behavior does not appear to exhibit WTP/WTA discrepancies. 
Bidding behavior for the heterogeneous value treatments suggests that social preferences 
do play a role. Whereas mean bids are statistically equal to value in 39 of the 40 treatments 
involving private good or homogeneous value settings, there are many instances in 
heterogeneous treatments where mean bids are statistically different than induced value. Overall, 
as illustrated in Figure 2, low-value subjects tend to bid above value and high-value subjects to 
bid below value.  As can be seen in the cumulative distributions in Figure 3, subjects’ bids/offers 
in the heterogeneous value treatments systemically deviated from their bids/offers in either the 
private treatments or the public homogeneous value treatments.   
As can be seen by inspecting Tables 3 and 4, in seven out of the eight treatments where 
the lowest-value subject has an induced value more than a dollar less than the middle-value 
subject (subjects with induced gains and losses of $1 and $2), subjects significantly raise their 
WTP/WTA relative to the induced value. Likewise, when the highest-value subjects had an 
induced value that was more than a dollar higher than the middle-value subject ($8 and $9 
values), subjects significantly lowered their WTP/WTA in seven of the eight treatments. When 
the low-value (high-value) subject has a value close to the middle-value subject, statistical 
differences between bids and induced values are not generally observed. 
There is not a systematic divergence from induced values for middle-value ($5) subjects. 
Symmetric distributions produce bids that are roughly equal with value, although in one of four 
cases there is a statistical difference. In asymmetric distribution treatments, there is a weak 
tendency for middle-value subjects to bid below value when their value is above average (i.e. the 
  
28
$1, $5, $6 distribution) and a weak tendency to bid average value when their value is below 
average (i.e. the $4, $5, $9 distribution).  
Finally, we investigate the extent to which the social welfare theories discussed in 
Section 3 are consistent with observed bidding behavior using data from public good treatments. 
In particular, we estimate the unknown parameters (i.e. α and β) of the theory-specific optimal 
bid functions. Estimated parameters that are statistically different than zero, with the correct sign, 
provide evidence that a particular theory has the ability to organize the data. Further, estimated 
parameters shed light on the relative importance of social versus selfish preferences on bidding 
behavior. 
Consistent with our previous framework, we use a linear regression approach to estimate 
unknown parameters; to allow for heteroscedasticity and the correlation of individual-level 
responses, we estimate robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the subject level. The bid 
function parameters for the two equity models are directly estimable (imposing the constraint 
that the coefficient on πi equals one). However, the bid functions for the Social Efficiency, 
Maximin, and the combined Efficiency-Maximin theory are nonlinear in the unknown 
parameter(s). This does not preclude linear regression as the bid functions can be re-written as 
linear in unknown parameters and our estimates of interest recovered from these in a 
straightforward fashion. For example, we can express the Maximin bid function as: 
wiiB πδπδ 21 +=          (8) 
where ( )iαδ += 111  and ( )ii ααδ += 12 . The parameter αi is overidentified. It can be easily 
shown that δ2 = 1 - δ1, and we can impose this restriction directly into the model to resolve the 
identification issue. The restricted model is: 
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)(1 wiwiB ππδπ −=−          (9) 
With an estimate of δ1 in hand, an estimate of αi and its standard error can be obtained using the 
delta-method. In a similar vein, exactly identified specifications that correspond to the Efficiency 
and Efficiency-Maximin theories can be constructed. 
 Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate individual-specific coefficients from our 
design. We instead constrain the unknown parameters to be equal across individuals, and what 
we estimate are best thought of as bid functions for the representative individual in the sample. 
Further, for estimation purposes we include an error term and an overall model constant. 
Although the theoretical bid functions do not imply a constant term, whether or not one should 
be included is essentially an empirical question. If the mean of the error term is not zero, for 
instance, omitting the constant term would serve to distort coefficient estimates.  
Table 5 presents bid functions, estimated by pooling the entire sample as well as 
estimated separately for the WTP and WTA treatments. Pooling WTP (WTA) gains and loss data 
is justified by statistical tests, and data from all welfare settings can be justifiably pooled for all 
but the Maximin specification. The two equity-based specifications are not supported by the 
data. The parameter of the ERC model is not statistically different than zero and has the incorrect 
sign. The two parameters of the FS model are statistically different than zero. However, the 
result α < 0 is inconsistent with the theory. In particular, it suggests that individuals bid to 
increase disadvantageous inequality (i.e. reduce equality).  
Consistent with the respective theories, the estimated parameter for both the Social 
Efficiency and Maximin model is positive and statistically different from zero at the 1% level. 
The estimate of α = 0.057 in the WTP Efficiency model implies that the weights on self-
interest, ( )α211 + , and efficiency,  ( )αα 21+ , are equal to 0.90 and 0.05, respectively. This 
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suggests that if own payoff from a program increases by $1, ceteris paribus, the average 
individual increases his bid by $0.90. If the program payoff to another group member increases 
by $1, ceteris paribus, an individual increases his bid by $0.05. This suggests an individual is 
willing to give up $0.05 in order to give a $1 to someone else. In a similar vein, the WTP 
Maximin model implies that an individual, ceteris paribus, increases his bid by $0.92 for a $1 
increase in own payoff and by $0.08 for a $1 increase in the payoff to the worst-off group 
member.    
The empirical support of both the Social Efficiency and Maximin theories motivated an 
examination of whether a model that accounts for both motives (along with self-interest) would 
be a better depiction of observed behavior, and is the reason we considered such a theory in 
Section 3. However, the estimated parameters of this Efficiency-Maximin model lend support for 
a Social Efficiency-only model. In particular, we find that α > 0 and β = 0. This suggests that 
efficiency is a statistically significant motive and, once efficiency preferences are controlled for, 
Maximin preferences explain little about bidding behavior. Thus, the combined theory model 
essentially breaks down to a pure social efficiency model and, if anything, the inclusion of 
Maximin preferences simply serves to add noise to the relationship between efficiency and 
bidding behavior.  
A casual comparison between theoretical predictions and simple tests of mean bid against 
induced value provides further evidence that Maximin preferences, if present, are not the main 
driving force. For instance, in the heterogeneous treatments with a symmetric distribution one 
would expect that both middle- and high-value respondents would bid below value to help the 
worst-off individual. However, middle-value respondents tended to bid equal to value. Further, 
we should see worst-off individuals bidding at value, but it is clear that these individuals have 
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concerns for the persons who are better off. In sum, while some evidence exists that Maximin 
considerations may drive observed bidding behavior, preferences for efficiency seem most 
consistent with the data and explain a wider range of observed bidding patterns. 
V. Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the public good version of the BDM 
mechanism, which involves submitting a bid/offer as a vote in a coercive tax setting, is demand 
revealing both for induced values and for social preferences. In addition, no WTP/WTA 
discrepancies are evident for the induced values used in these experiments or for revealed social 
preferences. However, the result that participants with high induced gains (low induced gains) 
tend to understate (overstate) their WTP and WTA relative to the induced value (this pattern is 
mirrored in the induced loss treatments) is most succinctly explained by social concerns for 
efficiency (or, similarly, pure altruism).  
Equity or relative rank concerns do not seem to add much explanatory power in this 
setting utilizing induced values and undergraduate business/economics majors. These results are 
consistent with evidence presented by Charness and Rabin (2002) for efficiency preferences but 
not with the evidence they provide for equity preferences. The results presented here are entirely 
consistent with those of Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Both of these studies use student 
subjects. It also should be noted that our findings are consistent with a conjecture made by 
Johannesson et al. (1996) based on hypothetical voting among randomly chosen survey 
participants. These results are somewhat surprising, in that several studies (Engelmann and 
Strobel, 2006, Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt, forthcoming) have shown that non-business/economics 
students or adult participants are more likely to show concerns for equity than undergraduate 
business/economics majors. It is possible that the context of voting itself favors efficiency 
  
32
preferences over equity preferences. In contrast, other contextual settings, such as dictator 
games, may make equity much more salient both to business/economics student participants and 
others.  
The experiments presented in this paper represent a first step from which a number of 
issues can be examined further. Extensions of the RPVM include changes in voting group size 
when values are heterogeneously distributed, changes in the distributions of the heterogeneous 
treatments, multiple-round voting using heterogeneous distributions, the use of a variety of actual 
public goods, field application of the mechanism in situations where costs are unknown and the 
application of the mechanism to examine how various behavioral anomalies respond to different 
public good settings. Of particular importance is the impact of increasing both stakes and group 
size. It is trivial to show that efficiency preferences will decrease the probability of inefficient 
programs being funded. Consider a referendum on a program which has negative total net 
benefits but, because of heterogeneous benefits, the median voter has her own selfish benefit 
slightly greater than cost. If she has efficiency concerns similar to those found in a number of 
studies she will take into account that the sum of the net benefits to others is negative and weight 
those in her decision along with her own selfish net benefit. With a sufficiently large number of 
other voters, the effect of negative net benefits could easily outweigh her own positive net 
benefit and result in a vote against the program. Thus, the presence of preferences for efficiency 
raises the possibility that voting may be more efficient than is commonly supposed.   
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1 In a willingness to accept (WTA) setting, subjects indicate their minimum WTA and if the majority of offers are 
less than or equal to the randomly selected compensation, all subjects must accept this amount.  
2 To simplify exposition, we restrict the presentation to the situations where N is an odd number. Minor 
modifications are required to prove the claim when N is even, but the same conclusion is reached.    
3 Note that an individual’s optimal bid does not require knowledge of the jα of other individuals. 
4 In evaluating the results of Table 1, note that the basic formulation (Column 2) is given for WTP for Gains where 
0π >  and 0C > . Thus, the optimal bid (Column 3) is a positive amount and the behavioral prediction (Column 4) 
is readily interpreted. For the other cases, the optimal bid formula and the behavioral predictions are written for the 
absolute values of iπ , jπ and C and therefore positive values for *iB .  
5 Similar to Section 3, for ease of exposition we refer to induced values in absolute terms for the remainder of the 
paper.  
6 Similar patterns exist for the other three welfare treatments and are available upon request from the authors. 
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APPENDIX A: DICHOTOMOUS CHOICE DESIGN AND INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Design 
Two sets of sessions were employed, one where all decision tasks involved heterogeneous 
distributions (Table A1) and the other which involved heterogeneous and homogenous tasks 
(Table A2). As shown in Table A1, the order of the first two induced values, $2 and $8, are 
reversed in the two sessions. In Session A, the 1st vote for each subject ($2 induced value) is 
combined with the 3rd vote ($5 induced value) from one other subject and the 4th vote ($8 
induced value) of a third subject to determine the outcome of the group vote. The design for 
votes on programs with equal values of $2 or $8 is constructed similarly (Table A2).  The extra 
four votes are not needed to complete the voting triplets. These additional votes are used to 
explore heterogeneous values for the $5 individuals.  
 
Instructions 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  In the course of the experiment, you 
will have opportunities to earn money.  Any money earned during this experiment is yours to 
keep.  It is therefore important that you read these instructions carefully.  Please do not 
communicate with other participants during the experiment. 
 
In today’s experiment, you will be asked to vote for or against six different programs.  In this 
experiment, a program is simply a distribution of money.  As you will see, your vote will help 
determine whether or not the program is funded.  The procedures that will be followed are the 
same for all programs.  However, each program and vote is independent from the other.  
Therefore, your vote in one program will not affect the results for other programs. 
 
Only one of the six programs will actually be implemented and result in cash earnings.  At the 
conclusion of the experiment, we will randomly determine which of the programs will generate 
cash earnings by drawing from a bag containing six chips lettered A through F which correspond 
to each program.   
 
For each program, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
For each of the programs, you will be part of a group of three voters.  First, you and every other 
member of your group will receive an initial balance of $10.00.   
 
You will then be informed of your personal payoff amount for this program.  Your personal 
payoff amount is the amount of money that you will receive if the program is funded.  Your 
personal payoff amount will vary during the course of the experiment.  The possible amounts are 
$2.00, $5.00, and $8.00.  The payoff amounts that the other voters in your group would receive if 
the program is funded are indicated on your computer spreadsheet.  Your spreadsheet also will 
inform you of the per person cost of the program.  This is the cost that you and everyone else in 
your group would have to pay if the program is funded. 
 
You will then be asked to vote for (“Yes”) or against (“No”) this program.  You will submit your 
vote by clicking the “Submit” button.  For each program, there are two possible outcomes: 
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The program is NOT FUNDED: The program is not funded if a majority of votes from your 
group are “No.”  In this case, neither you nor any other member of your group will receive a 
personal payoff amount and no one will pay the cost.  Therefore, your cash earnings for this part 
of the experiment would simply be your initial balance of $10.00. 
 
The program is FUNDED: The program is funded if a majority of votes from your group are 
“Yes.”   In this case, you will receive your personal payoff amount in addition to your initial 
balance.  However, you will also have to pay the per person cost.  Every other member of your 
group will also receive their personal payoff amount and they will also have to pay the same per 
person cost.  Therefore, your cash earnings would be your initial balance ($10.00), plus your 
personal payoff amount, minus the per person cost. 
 
At the conclusion of the experiment, a volunteer subject will draw which of the six programs will 
be implemented to determine your cash payoff.  Upon notification by the administrator, please 
click the “Update Results” button. 
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APPENDIX B – RANDOM PRICE VOTING MECHANISM INSTRUCTIONS (WPT-GAINS) 
 
Part A – Low-Incentive Private Practice Rounds 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  In the course of the experiment, you 
will have opportunities to earn money.  Any money earned during this experiment is yours to 
keep.  It is therefore important that you read these instructions carefully.  Please do not 
communicate with other participants during the experiment. 
 
In today’s experiment, you will be asked to indicate the highest amount of money you would pay 
and still vote for different programs.  In this experiment, a program is simply a distribution of 
money.  As you will see, the amount that you indicate as the highest amount that you would pay 
for the program will become a vote in favor or against the program, and will determine whether 
or not the program is funded.  It is therefore important that you consider all of the information 
given to you about the different programs and that you make judicious decisions.  The 
procedures that will be followed are the same for all programs.  However, each program and vote 
is independent from the other.  Therefore, the decisions you make and the result of a vote for one 
program will not affect the results for other programs. 
 
For each program, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
First, you will receive an initial balance of $10.00.   
 
You will then be informed of your “personal payoff amount” for this program.  Your personal 
payoff amount is the amount of money that you will receive if the program is funded.  Your 
personal payoff amount will vary during the course of the course of the experiment.  The 
possible amounts are $2.00, $5.00, and $8.00.  
 
You will then be asked to write down the highest amount that you would pay and still vote for 
this program; we will call this your “bid”.  For each program, you can bid any amount between 
$0.00 and your initial balance of $10.00.  Once you have decided your bid, you will write it on a 
Voting Sheet and enter it into the computer spreadsheet.  We will then collect the Voting Sheets 
and determine the cost of the program.   
 
The cost of the program will be determined by reading off three numbers from a random number 
table.  The starting number will be determined by dropping a pen onto the random number table.  
(If more than one mark occurs from the drop, then the one closest to the upper-left corner will be 
used.)  The numbers will be read from left to right on the table.  The first number will represent 
the dollar amount.  The second number will represent the dime amount.  The third number will 
represent the penny amount.  Together, the three numbers will form a cost between $0.00 and 
$9.99.  Note: since these numbers have been generated by a random number table each cost 
between $0.00 and $9.99 is equally likely.  Once the cost has been determined, you will be asked 
to enter it into the spreadsheet on your computer. 
 
Whether or not the program is funded depends on the amount of your bid and the cost of the 
program.  There two possible outcomes: 
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The program is NOT FUNDED: The program is not funded if your bid is less than the cost 
determined from the random number table.  In this case, you will not receive your personal 
payoff amount and you will not have to pay the cost.  Therefore, your earnings for this portion of 
the experiment would simply be your initial balance of $10.00. 
 
The program is FUNDED: The program is funded if your bid is equal to or greater than the cost 
determined from the random number table.  In this case, you will receive your personal payoff 
amount in addition to your initial balance.  However, you will also have to pay the determined 
cost.  Therefore, your cash earnings for this portion of the experiment would be your initial 
balance ($10.00), plus your personal payoff amount, minus the cost.  
 
Note how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the program.  With your bid, you are 
writing down the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the program.  Therefore, your 
bid is like a vote in favor of the program if you are prepared to pay an amount equal to or greater 
than the randomly determined cost.  On the other hand, your bid is like a vote against the 
program if your bid turns out to be less than the cost.  Since you are the only voter, your bid will 
determine whether the program is funded or not. 
 
While your bid helps determine whether the program is funded or not, your earnings for a 
particular program are based on your initial balance, your personal payoff amount and the 
determined cost.  For example, if a program was not funded and your personal payoff was $5.00 
and the determined cost was $9.00, your earnings would be $10.00.  However, if the program 
was funded with the same personal payoff and cost, your earnings would be only $6.00 ($10 + $5 
- $9).  Consider another example where your personal payoff was $5.00 and the determined cost 
was $2.00.  In this example if the program was funded your earnings would be $13.00 ($10 + $5 
- $2), while if the program was not funded, your earnings would be only $10.00. 
 
Calculation of Your Earnings 
Once you enter the cost of the program determined from the random number table, the computer 
will automatically determine whether the program was funded and calculate your earnings.  At 
the end of the experiment, the computer will add your experimental earnings for all of the 
programs, and convert this amount to US dollars by applying an exchange rate of one US dollar 
for twenty experimental dollars.  For example, if you earn $232.45 experimental dollars, your 
monetary payoff from this part of the experiment would be $11.62.  At the end of the 
experiment, we will audit all of the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy. 
 
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment. 
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Part II – High Incentive Private and Public Treatments 
For the second part of this experiment, you will now be asked to indicate how much you would 
pay for each of 12 separate programs.  The procedures are similar to the ones used in the first 
part of the experiment, except for four important differences. 
 
1)  For each of the programs, you may be the only voter (as in the first part of the experiment), 
but you may also be part of a group of 3 or 15 voters.  For programs where the group size is 3 
or 15, the payoff amounts that the other voters in your group would receive if the program is 
funded are indicated on your Voting Sheet.   
 
2)  Only one of the 12 programs will actually be implemented and result in cash earnings.  
Therefore, all votes will be made prior to determination of any costs.  After the Voting Sheets 
are collected, we will randomly determine which of the programs will generate cash earnings 
by drawing from a bag containing 12 chips lettered A through L.  Each letter corresponds to 
one of the 12 programs.   
 
3)   For the program that generates cash earnings, the exchange rate will be one US dollar for one 
experimental dollar.  For example, if you earn $12.25 experimental dollars in the second part 
of the experiment, your monetary payoff would be $12.25.  
 
4)  Again, you must decide the highest amount that you would pay and still vote for the program.  
However, now you will be part of a group.  Therefore, in determining your bid you may want 
to consider how your bid will impact others in your group. 
 
For each program, the experiment proceeds as follows:  
You and every other member of your group will receive an initial balance of $10.00.   
 
For each program, your personal payoff amount may be $2.00, $5.00, or $8.00.  Other 
participants will also receive one of these three payoff amounts. 
 
For each program, you will be asked to write your bid on the Voting Sheet provided and enter 
the same amount into the second spreadsheet on the computer.  Consider all of the information 
for the program before writing down your bid.  For each program, you can bid any amount 
between $0.00 and your initial balance of $10.00.   
 
Once everyone has written down his/her bid and entered the bid into the computer, we will 
collect the Voting Sheets and distribute the new Voting Sheets for the next program.  After bids 
for all the programs have been entered and Voting Sheets collected, we will determine which of 
the programs will be implemented and produce cash earnings. 
 
Next, we will determine the cost of the program to be implemented and whether or not it will be 
funded by your group.  The cost of the program will be determined in exactly the same manner 
as before, except that a new random number table will be used.  However, this cost will now be a 
cost that each person in your group will have to pay if the program is funded.  Each person will 
have to pay the same amount. 
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Whether or not the program is funded depends on the bids by members of your group and the 
cost of the program.  Once again, there are two possible outcomes: 
 
The program is NOT FUNDED: The program is not funded if a majority of bids from your group 
are less than the cost determined from the random number table.  In this case, neither you nor 
any other member of your group will receive a personal payoff amount and no one will pay the 
cost.  Therefore, your cash earnings for this part of the experiment would simply be your initial 
balance of $10.00. 
 
The program is FUNDED: The program is funded if a majority of bids from your group are 
equal to or greater than the cost determined from the random number table.  In this case, you 
will receive your personal payoff amount in addition to your initial balance.  However, you will 
also have to pay the randomly determined cost.  Every other member of your group will also 
receive their personal payoff amount and they will also have to pay the determined cost.  
Therefore, your cash earnings would be your initial balance ($10.00), plus your personal payoff 
amount, minus the cost. 
 
The programs, in which you are a group of one, are identical to the programs you experienced in 
the first part of the experiment.  Therefore, the program is not funded if your bid is less than the 
cost determined from the random number table, and program is funded if your bid is equal to or 
greater than the determined cost. 
 
Note once again how your bid is like a vote for or against funding the program.  With your bid, 
you are writing down the highest amount you would pay and still vote for the program.  
Therefore, your bid is like a vote in favor of the program if you are prepared to pay an amount 
equal or greater than the randomly determined cost.  On the other hand, your bid is like a vote 
against the program if it turns out to be less than the cost.  When a majority of bids are equal to 
or greater than the determined cost, this translates into a majority vote in favor of the program.  
Similarly, a majority of bids below the cost translates into a majority vote against the program at 
that cost. 
 
Calculation of Final Earnings 
To calculate your earnings from Part B, you will be asked to enter into the spreadsheet the cost 
for the implemented program and whether this program was funded.  Your computer will then 
calculate your earnings for Part B, add them to your earnings from Part A, and award you an 
additional $5 show up fee.  We will audit the spreadsheets to ensure accuracy. 
 
It is important that you clearly understand these instructions. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
Please do not talk with other participants in the experiment. 
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Table A1: Dichotomous Choice Experiment – Heterogeneous Value Design (n=86). 
 
 
Session A 
  Initial  Own  Others Uniform Expected 
Treatment Endowment  Benefit Benefits    Cost  Earnings  
 
1st  $10  $2        $5, $8           $2.50  $9.50 
2nd  $10  $8        $2, $5           $7.50  $10 
 
3rd   $10  $5        $2, $8           $2.50  $12.50 
4th   $10  $8        $2, $5           $2.50  $15.50 
5th   $10  $2        $5, $8           $7.50  $10 
6th   $10  $5        $2, $8           $7.50  $10 
 
 
 
Session B 
  Initial  Own  Others Uniform Expected 
Treatment Endowment  Benefit Benefits    Cost  Earnings  
 
1st  $10  $8        $2, $5           $7.50  $10 
2nd    $10  $2        $5, $8           $2.50  $9.50 
 
3rd  $10  $5        $2, $8           $7.50  $10 
4th   $10  $2        $5, $8           $7.50  $10 
5th   $10  $8        $2, $5           $2.50  $15.50 
6th    $10  $5        $2, $8           $2.50  $12.50 
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Table A2: Dichotomous Choice Experiment – Homogeneous Value Design (n=88) 
 
 
Session A 
  Initial  Own  Others Uniform Expected 
Treatment Endowment  Benefit Benefits    Cost  Earnings  
1st  $10  $2        $2, $2           $2.50  $10 
2nd    $10  $8        $8, $8           $7.50  $10.50 
 
3rd  $10  $2        $5, $8          $4.50  $7.50 
4th  $10  $5        $2, $8          $4.50  $10 
5th  $10  $8        $2, $5           $4.50  $13.50 
6th  $10  $5        $5, $5           $4.50  $10 
        
 
 
 
Session B 
  Initial  Own  Others Uniform Expected 
Treatment Endowment  Benefit Benefits    Cost  Earnings  
1st  $10  $8        $8, $8           $7.50  $10.50 
2nd  $10  $2        $2, $2           $2.50  $10 
 
3rd   $10  $8        $2, $5           $5.50  $10 
4th   $10  $5        $2, $8          $5.50  $10 
5th   $10  $2        $5, $8          $5.50  $10 
6th  $10  $5        $5, $5           $5.50  $10 
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Table 2.  Selected Comparisons between Dichotomous Choice and RPVM in a WTP-Gains 
Setting and Symmetric Value Distributionsa  
 
   Distribution Percent 
Mechanism Value Cost of Values “Yes” t-stat p-value 
 
DC Voting $2 $2.50 Heterogeneous 18.6% 0.825 0.4102 
RPVM $2 $2.50 Heterogeneous 23.7% 
 
DC Voting $2 $2.50 Homogeneous 5.7% 1.469 0.1436 
RPVM $2 $2.50 Homogeneous 11.8% 
 
DC Voting $8 $7.50 Heterogeneous 73.3% 1.350 0.1787 
RPVM $8 $7.50 Heterogeneous 81.7% 
 
DC Voting $8 $7.50 Homogeneous 86.4% 1.330 0.1854 
RPVM $8 $7.50 Homogeneous 92.5% 
 
a Sample size is 93 for RPVM, 88 for Homogeneous DC Voting, and 86 for Heterogeneous DC 
Voting. 
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Table 3. Random Price Voting Mechanism Experiment Results, Induced Gains. 
 
                Privatea   Homogeneousb   Heterogeneousc   
 Value  WTP WTA Others  WTP WTA Others  WTP WTA 
 
 $1   $1, $1 $1.25 $1.28 $5, $6 $1.40 $1.91 
  
 $2 $2.10 $1.96 $2, $2 $2.06 $2.06 $5, $8 $2.64 $2.47 
  
 $4   $4, $4 $4.06 $3.90 $5, $9 $4.26 $4.77 
  
       $1, $6 $4.95 $4.74 
 $5 $5.09 $5.12 $5, $5 $5.10 $5.03 $2, $8 $5.19 $5.06 
       $4, $9 $5.31 $5.35 
  
 $6   $6, $6 $6.08 $6.14 $1, $5 $5.90 $5.64 
  
 $8 $8.11 $8.15 $8, $8 $8.14 $8.18 $2, $5 $7.78 $7.75 
  
 $9   $9, $9 $8.75 $8.84 $4, $5 $8.24 $8.41 
 
Note: estimates that are statistically different than induced value at 5% level are italicized. 
a  For both WTP and WTA, n=93. 
b  For both WTP and WTA, n = 138 for the homogeneous distribution of values of $5; n = 93 for 
the homogeneous distribution of values of $2 and $8; and n = 45 for the homogeneous 
distribution of values value of $1, $4, $6, and $9.    
c  For both WTP and WTA, n = 93 for the heterogeneous distribution of values of $2, $5, $8 and 
n = 45 for the heterogeneous distribution of values of $1, $5, $6 and $4, $5, $9. 
  
47
Table 4. Random Price Voting Mechanism Experiment Results, Induced Losses. 
 
                Privated   Homogeneouse   Heterogeneousf   
 Value  WTP WTA Others  WTP WTA Others  WTP WTA 
 
 $1   $1, $1 $1.04 $1.07 $5, $6 $1.24 $1.77 
  
 $2 $2.23 $2.06 $2, $2 $2.14 $2.11 $5, $8 $2.67 $2.54 
  
 $4   $4, $4 $3.93 $3.98 $5, $9 $4.18 $4.47 
  
                  $1, $6 $4.74 $4.36 
 $5 $5.19 $4.68 $5, $5 $4.98 $4.92 $2, $8 $5.38 $4.82 
       $4, $9 $5.05 $5.67 
  
 $6   $6, $6 $6.01 $6.26 $1, $5 $5.73 $5.42 
  
 $8 $7.99 $7.91 $8, $8 $7.80 $7.94 $2, $5 $7.68 $7.29 
  
 $9   $9, $9 $8.91 $8.87 $4, $5 $8.30 $8.35 
 
Note: estimates that are statistically different than induced value at 5% level are italicized. 
d  For both WTP and WTA, n=93. 
e  For both WTP and WTA, n = 138 for the homogeneous distribution of values of -$5; n = 93 for 
the homogeneous distribution of values of $2 and $8; and n = 45 for the homogeneous 
distribution of values value of $1, $4, $6, and $9.    
f  For both WTP and WTA, n = 93 for the heterogeneous distribution of values of $2, $5, $8 and 
n = 45 for the heterogeneous distribution of values of $1, $5, $6 and $4, $5, $9. 
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Table 5. Estimated Bid Functions† 
 
 Efficiency Maximin ERC 
 
FS Efficiency and 
Maximin 
WTP Data, n = 2106 
α 0.057** 
(0.013) 
0.082** 
(0.023) 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.108** 
(0.025) 
0.069** 
(0.016) 
β – – 
 
– 0.097** 
(0.023) 
-0.037 
(0.023) 
WTA Data, n = 2106 
α 0.084** 
(0.017) 
0.140** 
(0.032) 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
-0.164** 
(0.029) 
0.087** 
(0.019) 
β – 
 
– – 0.125** 
(0.028) 
-0.009 
(0.030) 
WTP & WTA Data, n = 4212 
α 0.070** 
(0.011) 
0.070** 
(0.018) 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.136** 
(0.019) 
0.076** 
(0.014) 
β – – – 0.111** 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.024) 
Notes:  *, ** denote estimate is statistically different than zero at 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
† Pooling the WTP & WTA data is not supported statistically for the Maximin model. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
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 Figure 1.  Voting Bias in Dichotomous Choice Voting (WTP-Gains) 
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Figure 2. Bids and Offers in Private, Public Homogeneous, and Public Heterogeneously 
Value Treatments 
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Figure 3. Cumulative Distributions of WTP-Bids for Private, Public Homogeneous, and Public 
Heterogeneous, Symmetric Values6 
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